I recently visited India for the first time in more than a decade. I marveled at the change in atmosphere — and in atmospherics. New Delhi was bustling and seemed to have even more cars than people. There was a great sense of confidence that the global economic crisis would somehow pass India by — economic growth is still being estimated at more than 7 percent for 2009, at a time when most of the rest of the world is in or near recession.

The biggest change of atmospherics, however, centered on Indian attitudes toward the United States. It used to be at meetings dealing with Indo-U.S. relations that the first session was reserved for what India-watchers described as "ritualistic throat clearing," as Indian interlocutors berated their American counterparts for all past U.S. sins, real and imagined. Once this "need" was satisfied, you could then proceed to meaningful conversation.

This ritual was refreshingly absent at the several meetings I attended. The U.S.-India relationship was seen in a positive light, with appreciation for past accomplishments — George W. Bush is clearly more popular in India than in the United States — and great hope for the future and the promise an Obama administration brings. There was also great fondness for former President Bill Clinton, who started the ball rolling when it comes to improved Indo-U.S. relations, and great faith that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would keep the momentum going.

This does not mean that there is nothing but smooth sailing ahead. Within two sentences of his speech to an international audience, the Indian defense minister was launching an only slightly veiled attack against Pakistan as the real perpetrator of the horrific Mumbai attacks last November; the first sentence was to welcome us all to the conference. While Washington seems to have a love-hate relationship with Islamabad, there is no doubt where New Delhi falls on the affection meter. Indians remain perplexed by America's marriage of convenience with Pakistan, arguing that a partnership in the war on terror with one of its primary proponents makes little sense.

And it does not take long for the topic to turn to China. One of the great ironies in dealing with India strategically is that New Delhi is very careful not to be seen as a "card" that Washington can play against China. Yet, New Delhi sees Beijing as its chief rival and potential adversary and worries about Chinese "encirclement" as China sustains its historic "special relationship" with Islamabad and also increases its ties with many of India's immediate neighbors in Central and South Asia and in Southeast Asia as well. Burma (aka Myanmar) is an especially sensitive "battlefield" in this regard. While it does not want to be drawn into any U.S. containment strategy vis-a-vis China, it seems that New Delhi would like to have the U.S. in its China deck, even as it strives to improve its relations with Beijing.

As part of its "Look East" strategy, India is also expanding its ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, becoming a member of the security-oriented ministerial level ASEAN Regional Forum and "leader's led" East Asia Summit.

In 2008, after six years of wrangling, India completed a Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN, which was to be signed at the December EAS in Bangkok; that has since postponed to sometime in late April 2009. While somewhat limited in scope — several hundred items are not subject to a reduction of duties or other barriers — it still promises to help accelerate growing economic ties between India and the 10 ASEAN nations; two-way trade is estimated to be up by more than 25 percent this year.

New Delhi also seems eager to strengthen bilateral ties with Tokyo and to develop a more meaningful India-Japan-U.S. trilateral relationship. Last fall, during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Tokyo, the two countries issued a Joint Statement on the Advancement of a Strategic and Global Partnership and a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, codifying a number of existing agreements while signaling a desire for still closer cooperation in security affairs.

Despite India's improved ties with the countries of East Asia and the corresponding improvement in Indo-U.S. relations, cooperation between New Delhi and Washington in East Asia remains lacking. At the ARF, where Washington is pushing a more proactive agenda, India is among those seemingly putting on the brakes. Nor does Washington seem particularly supportive of India's aspirations to join the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation gathering of economies, perhaps due to U.S. dissatisfaction with India's unyielding opposition to the U.S. position at the current (failed) Doha round of World Trade Organization negotiations.

Nonetheless, given India's "Look East" policies and the increased U.S. emphasis on East Asia, this region represents fertile ground for future Indo-U.S. cooperation, if the two sides are truly committed to broadening and deepening ties between the world's two largest democracies.

Ralph Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International studies, a Honolulu-based think tank specializing in current and emerging political, security, economic and business issues across the Pacific Rim. He wrote this commentary for The Advertiser.

Reach Ralph A. Cossa at (Unknown address).