What's wrong with the war in Afghanistan? Here's my short list:

• The American people don't support it. General George S. Patton often said that Americans love a winner and have no patience for a loser. After eight years of military involvement in Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgency has grown tenfold. That smells like a loser to me and to the 57 percent of our fellow citizens who do not support the continuation of this war. Generals from Clausewitz to Powell have warned nations not to fight wars that their people do not support.

• Our allies don't support it. The war is vastly unpopular in Europe and is becoming an increasingly American enterprise. Given the restrictions that some of our allies put on the use of those forces that they grudgingly contribute, a wry joke has circulated among U.S. troops about the International Security Assistance Force: "ISAF stands for I Saw Americans Fight!"

• The rationale for our involvement has been overcome by events. We went to Afghanistan to destroy al-Qaida. Removing the Taliban from power was a means to that end, because the Taliban gave al-Qaida sanctuary. Unfortunately, al-Qaida survived its eviction and is now operating in Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, Pakistan, Western Europe, Southeast Asia and the United States. The Taliban are interested in running Afghanistan, not in bombing New York. The Taliban are not a threat to us, and al-Qaida doesn't need Afghanistan anymore.

• It still isn't resourced adequately and we can't afford to do so. Based on historical norms, the population of Afghanistan, and the current size of Afghan security forces, we should probably maintain a sustained troop level of 260,000. The administration committed to a force of about 140,000 because our military just isn't big enough to send more. Our treasury isn't big enough, either. The annual cost of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is estimated to be $1 million per soldier, meaning that the war will cost nearly $140 billion next year. Our $12 trillion national debt poses a bigger threat to our future security than the Taliban ever will.

• Our continued presence generates a greater threat than it suppresses. When Osama Bin Laden issued his infamous call for jihad against "Crusaders and Jews," his chief complaint was a minor U.S. Air Force presence in Saudi Arabia that no longer exists. The presence of non-Muslim armies in traditionally Muslim lands is viewed as an attack on Islam and is the cause cél[0xe8]bre for the worldwide jihadist movement. It certainly has been a lightning rod for Taliban recruiting in Pakistan. If al-Qaida went back to Afghanistan, we'd be better off killing them there than in Pakistan, which tends to get a little touchy about collateral damage, and has nuclear weapons.

• The desired end-state is unachievable. Matthew Hoh, a former Marine officer with two tours in Iraq, said it best when he resigned from his State Department position in Afghanistan: "Like the Soviet Union, we continue to secure and bolster a failing state, while encouraging an ideology and system of government unknown and unwanted by its people."

In essence, we have intervened in a 35-year-old civil war in which urban, secular and modern Afghans struggle against their rural, religious and traditional countrymen. We might have a chance were it not for the thoroughly corrupt and illegitimate government with whom we have now made common cause.

At most, we should conduct carefully targeted special operations aimed at al-Qaida. "Counterinsurgency lite" is the wrong strategy for Afghanistan.

Thomas D. Farrell, a Ho­nolulu attorney, served as an Army Reserve intelligence officer during a 30-year career, including a tour in Iraq from June 2005 to May 2006. He wrote this commentary for The Advertiser.