"Old Generals never die, they just fade away." After nearly nine years as Pakistan's military dictator and president, it is time for Pervez Musharraf to step aside in the interests of his country.

Musharraf's long ride as head of the "world's most dangerous country" is as remarkable for its achievements as it is for its disappointments. It is fair to argue that he was the right man in 1999 when a military coup ousted civilian politicians whom the public saw as voraciously corrupt. Musharraf implemented an aggressive anti-corruption campaign, surrounded himself with world-class technocrats to steer the economy and promised a return to democracy.

Musharraf was the right man again in 2001. He reversed Pakistan's support for the Taliban in Afghanistan that provided safe harbor to al-Qaeda. Pakistan's military intelligence service, the ISI, worked seamlessly for a couple of years with the FBI and CIA to bring down al-Qaeda safe houses in cities throughout Pakistan.

The Pakistani people benefited. The United States lifted the failing economy with grant aid and removed sanctions related to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Foreign investment and remittances poured in. The economy grew at an average of more than 7 percent annually. Musharraf liberalized the media and presided over an earthquake relief program in 2005 that avoided what could have been a humanitarian disaster.

But, his failures were as striking as his successes.

Extremism under his leadership spread like a wildfire. Al-Qaeda re-established training camps and a global operation via the Internet from the Afghan-Pakistan border region. Musharraf's supposedly first-rate Pakistan army and ISI couldn't find and dismantle Mullah Omar's Taliban followers — presumably being directed from the provincial capital of Quetta. And now, at a time when extremist violence openly targets Pakistan's officials and threatens national stability, the ISI reportedly has aided militant groups in an attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul.

Musharraf's counterterrorism efforts are also unpopular with his people. Eight out of 10 Pakistanis oppose military action against the Taliban. They blame Musharraf for doing the bidding of the Bush administration.

Musharraf's fall from grace with his public was in large part due to his resistance to the transition to civilian democracy. His personal contempt for civilian politicians was palpable. Only after intense international and public pressure did he finally take off his dual hat as both chief of the army and president.

Perhaps the episode that began Musharraf's final slide in popularity was his assault on the independent judiciary. Musharraf tried to remove Supreme Court Justice Iftikar Chaudhry in March 2007. Tens of thousands of Pakistan's most educated people took to the streets to support the chief justice. Musharraf forcibly put down the demonstrations. Judges and lawyers were placed under house arrest. Last November, he imposed emergency rule, suspended the constitution and then amended it to provide more powers to the presidency. Musharraf then used emergency powers to tilt the impending elections in favor of his party.

The Musharraf of 2007 was not the same leader of 1999 and 2001. Still, Pakistani democracy was resilient. In a tragic way, the assassination of leading political figure Benazir Bhutto just before the election ensured enough new voters to overwhelm any fix in place. The new chief of the army is credited for refusing to allow Pakistan's strongest institution to be used by the government to manipulate the February 2008 election.

That should have been the start of a happier story for Pakistan. But six months after the civilian government assumed power, it found itself paralyzed over how to deal with the president and the judiciary. After squabbling for months, the coalition government now has agreed to proceed with impeachment proceedings against Musharraf. The process of bringing a no-confidence vote to the provincial assemblies, followed by hearings on impeachment charges by the regional assembly and senate, could paralyze Pakistan's government for weeks to come and create a major distraction from the country's pressing problems.

President Musharraf could fight back against the elected government. He could use his constitutional powers to dissolve the parliament, a move that would ignite a popular uprising. Musharraf would need the army to join him at the barricades. To its credit, the army is neither anxious to see the impeachment of its former chief nor to intervene on his behalf.

The logical way out would be for the military and others, including the Bush administration, to press Musharraf to resign in exchange for an agreement by the parties to take no further action against him. Anything else will plunge the Pakistan into a prolonged crisis from which extremist elements could be the prime beneficiaries.

Wendy Chamberlin is president of the Middle East Institute. She served as U.S. ambassador to Pakistan from 2001 to 2002. Opinions in this commentary are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Institute.