Almost 15 years ago in Madrid, I watched the diplomatic wizardry of James Baker, as the then-secretary of state pulled reluctant Arabs and Israelis into ground-breaking talks.

Baker was then working for Bush the father; his skills in getting sulky Syrians and the skeptical Israelis to meet were impressive. Now Baker has been recalled to use those skills to rescue Bush the son.

What's even more fascinating is the recall of another of Bush pere's team, former CIA-head Robert Gates to replace the departing Don Rumsfeld. Gates is part of Baker's bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which will offer Bush a set of Iraq policy options by early December.

Both Baker and Gates know the future options for Iraq are circumscribed by past U.S. mistakes. Iraq is now a broken state with a dysfunctional government, its society convulsed by low-grade civil war. So what plausible options can they offer the White House?

First some background, then on to the unpalatable choices facing Baker, Gates and us all.

The study group, co-chaired by former Democratic congressman Lee Hamilton, has listened to dozens of experts but hasn't begun to formulate its recommendations. However, Baker — and Gates — are foreign policy "realists" and not given to grand theories of remaking the Mideast in democratic mold.

While President Bush still talks of "victory" the Baker team is likely to define victory down. The best possible outcome would be to promote a pact between Iraqi factions that avoids all-out civil war and prevents Sunni areas of the country from falling under control of ultra-radical Islamists. This would foreclose the greatest potential threat to U.S. security: if the Sunni Anbar province becomes a base for training Arab terrorists — a la Afghanistan 1998.

U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad has so far failed to promote such a pact, and Iraqis themselves seem unable to do so. Baker's team will be aware that compromise solutions that look good on paper may fail on the ground.

There are three much-discussed options I don't think they'll recommend. First would be an immediate pullout of U.S. troops over the next six months. Such a pullout would trigger all-out civil war, and the failed state I describe above. If U.S. troops were moved to the Gulf, they would be in no position to prevent such a disaster.

Nor do I believe the Baker-Hamilton group will advise sending more troops. This might be desirable — right now U.S. troops are playing whack-a-mole as they fight radical Islamist insurgents. But the military says there are no more troops to send.

And I doubt the group will endorse a division of Iraq into three federal states, a la the plan suggested by Sen. Joe Biden. Sunnis strongly oppose this idea and aren't likely to be won over with promises of shared oil revenue. I don't see how U.S. pressure can force them to accept; if Iraq splits that way, Anbar province will likely become Taliban-land.

I think the study group will focus on options that play to the skills and predilections of Baker, Gates and the Bush pere realist vision. The goal will be to corral Iraqis into a reconciliation pact by getting their Shiite and Sunni neighbors on board. It will also be to shift the nature and numbers of U.S. troops.

My guess is that Baker will recommend an international conference of Iraq's neighbors and Iraqi political leaders, along with the United States and other major powers. The thinking would be to persuade Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and other Sunni states to help stabilize Iraq lest they face the blowback from an Iraqi failed state.

For such a conference to work, of course, the United States would have to talk directly to Tehran and Damascus. Interestingly, Gates was co-director of a 2004 Council on Foreign Relations Study on Iran policy that advocated that the United States engage directly with Iran. Baker has said publicly that it is not capitulation to talk with one's enemies.

No one knows, of course, whether Iran and Syria would cooperate on stabilizing Iraq, and for what price. Moreover, even their cooperation wouldn't solve the conundrum of how to defeat hard-line Sunni Islamists, and Baathists who seek to retake power in Baghdad.

But, again, my guess, is that the Baker group will suggest sending more skilled U.S. military trainers to work within Iraqi armed units, while, at the same time, drawing down regular U.S. forces over the next two years. If Iraq's neighbors bucked up Shiite and moderate Sunni leaders in Baghdad, Iraqi security forces — with embedded U.S. help — might have a government to fight for. This would be the hope.

Again, solutions on paper in Washington may well fail on the ground. But the options suggested by the team of Bush the Father may well be the best choices Bush the son is likely to get.

Trudy Rubin is a columnist and editorial-board member for the Philadelphia Inquirer. Reach her at trubin@phillynews.com.