The first East Asia Summit began yesterday in Kuala Lumpur. It brings together heads of government from the 10 ASEAN countries, their "Plus Three" partners (China, Japan and South Korea), plus India, Australia and New Zealand.

Russian President Vladimir Putin also has been invited to meet with the group, even though Russia is not yet a member. The United States, on the other hand, is specifically excluded; should Washington be worried?

The quick answer is "no."

Nonetheless, Washington will and should be watching the deliberations closely to see if certain members attempt to move this embryonic organization in a direction that runs contrary to U.S. interests. Washington remains interested in the composition of the group, the criteria for membership, and most importantly (and still largely undefined), its mission, objectives and priorities.

It is important to put this latest attempt at creating a sense of East Asia regionalism into context. No one seems to be promoting or anticipating a European Union-type arrangement. Attempts by Indonesia over the past two years to make the 10 Southeast Asian states that comprise ASEAN into a more coherent community "through the establishment of an ASEAN Security Community, an ASEAN Economic Community and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community" have shown just how difficult it is to get these nations (some of which have been closely aligned for more than 30 years) to think and act as one, especially in the security arena.

Developing a lowest common denominator for security cooperation among these 10 diverse nations is difficult enough; imagine adding China, Japan and South Korea — which refuse to even hold a side meeting in Kuala Lumpur — much less the others, to the mix.

If current established multilateral community-building mechanisms, such as ASEAN, ASEAN Plus Three (A+3), the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) "gathering of economies" are any indication of the willingness of these countries to seriously address issues of East Asia regionalism (and the "interference in one another's internal affairs" that true regional governance requires), one should not expect much progress soon.

Nor is it clear that the East Asia Summit is destined to become the foundation upon which an eventual East Asia Community will be built.

How an East Asian Community relates to the region's other multilateral organizations and initiatives — both institutionalized (like the the ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC) and ad hoc (like the Six-Party Talks and the Proliferation Security Initiative) — also will be a key factor affecting Washington's attitude, as will its adoption of global norms, especially in the areas of counterterrorism and counter-proliferation.

Will the East Asia Summit (or A+3, for that matter) reinforce or dilute these efforts? Will it help regional states more effectively address growing transnational challenges — or provide another excuse for avoiding such efforts? The answers to these questions will help determine Washington's attitude toward the East Asia Summit and any subsequent East Asian Community.

To the extent this new grouping signals its willingness to coexist with Washington, and is not seen as threatening or attempting to undermine Washington's bilateral alliances, its own central role in East Asian security affairs, or the broader Asia-Pacific regional institutions in which it participates, there is little reason to expect objections from Washington or a serious effort to discourage or derail this or any other regional-community-building efforts.

Serious questions remain about the prospects for (and intentions of) East Asia community-building efforts. How do members of this community — whoever they may be — define the relationship between Asia-only mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit or A+3 and broader efforts such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC?

Will the outcomes and efforts be mutually reinforcing? Will the "Asia for Asians" effort help set the stage for and supplement or even advance the broader dialogue, or will it be used as an excuse for inaction? If the former, how does one create avenues of interaction between East Asian and Asia-Pacific mechanisms to enhance their mutually supporting roles?

Until the answers to these questions become clear, it will be difficult to determine the prospects for the creation of a true East Asia Community and/or Washington's receptivity to this effort. Meanwhile, East Asia community building, with or without Washington, is not going to be easy, witness rising nationalism in Japan, China and South Korea. Unless and until all three can more effectively channel or control their respective nationalist tendencies, it is difficult to image a true East Asian community taking shape.

Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS (pacfo rum@hawaii.rr.com), a Hono-lulu-based nonprofit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.